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Abstract
We introduce R&D activity and R&D subsidies in the context of
a mixed oligopoly and evaluate the e⁄ects of privatization on welfare.
We show that when R&D subsidies are employed, privatization is wel-
fare and R&D promoting provided that the number of competitors is
su¢ ciently large.
Keywords: mixed oligopoly, process innovation, R&D subsidy, pri-
vatization.
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1 Introduction
There is a large body of literature on mixed oligopolies analyzing the ef-
fects on welfare of privatization. Interestingly, White (1996) and Poyago￿
Theotoky (2001) showed that when policy makers use output subsidies as
a policy instrument, the issue of privatization is not welfare related. Fur-
ther, Fjell and Heywood (2004) proved that privatization will bear negative
consequences on welfare if the public ￿rm remains as a leader in the post-
privatization regime.
The analysis in these papers has been con￿ned to output production and
consequently, subsidies to output. However, the study of the R&D activity
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1and R&D subsidies in the context of mixed oligopolies has not yet been
considered, despite the signi￿cant empirical evidence citing the importance
of public funding towards R&D (Katz, 2001) and the substantial presence
of public ￿rms in innovative industries (examples are the health-care sector,
Aanestad, 2003, and bioagriculture, Oehmke, 2001).
In this paper, we study the use of R&D subsidies in the context of a
mixed oligopoly and evaluate the e⁄ects of a privatization. We show that,
apart from addressing the market failures arising from the R&D activity, the
use of R&D subsidies corrects (to some extent) the ine¢ cient distribution
of production costs which arises in mixed industries. In that sense, an R&D
subsidy may (at least partially) serve the same purpose as an output subsidy.
Our results indicate that the optimal subsidy to R&D output is non-
monotone in the number of private ￿rms both in the private and the mixed
markets and it is always lower for the former than for the latter. Further,
when R&D subsidies are employed, privatization may increase total R&D
and welfare provided that the number of private ￿rms is su¢ ciently large.
The latter contrasts with the results obtained in previous contributions,
where output subsidies are employed.
2 The model
Consider an industry consisting of n identical private ￿rms and a public ￿rm
producing a homogeneous good. The inverse demand function is linear and
given by p(Q) = a￿Q; Q is aggregate output, Q = q0 +
Pn
i=1 qi, q0 denotes
the output of the public ￿rm and qi, i = 1;::;n, is the output of the i-th
private ￿rm. We postulate that all ￿rms engage in cost-reducing (process)
R&D and there are no spillovers.1 Thus, the production cost of each ￿rm
is represented by the quadratic function Cj(xj;qj) = (c ￿ xj)qj + q2
j, j 2
f0;1;:::;ng, where xj is the cost reduction of the j-th ￿rm and a > c > 0.2
We also make the standard assumption that R&D spending is subject to
diminishing returns to R&D expenditure, ￿j(xj) = x2
j, j 2 f0;1;:::;ng.
1In other words, the patent system is fully e⁄ective.
2The presence of the quadratic term is standard in the mixed oligopoly literature
and rules out the possibility of a public monopoly by introducing diminishing returns in
production.
2A ￿rm￿ s pro￿t function is given by
￿j = qj(a ￿
n X
j=0
qj) ￿ (c ￿ xj)qj ￿ q2
j ￿ x2
j + sxj, j 2 f0;1;:::;ng, (1)
where s denotes the (per unit) subsidy to R&D output. Social welfare,
de￿ned as the sum of consumer surplus, CS = (1=2)Q2 and producer surplus
net of R&D subsidies is given by







The timing of the game is as follows: In stage one, the government com-
mits to a subsidy on R&D output so as to maximize welfare. In stage two,
￿rms make their R&D decisions and in the last stage, a standard Cournot
game is played. We solve the entire game by backward induction to ob-
tain the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE henceforth) for both a
mixed and a private oligopoly and compare the results across the two mar-
ket arrangements.
3 Mixed oligopoly
Solving the last stage of the game, the respective equilibrium quantities of
the public and the private ￿rms are
qm
0 (x0;xi) =












In the second stage, the associated equilibrium R&D output levels are3
xm
0 (s) =
(a ￿ c)[￿3 + n(47 + 6n)] ￿ 2n2(6 + n)s




3(a ￿ c)(3 + n)(1 + 2n) + n[135 + n(56 + 6n)]s
￿15 + n[235 + 102n + 12n2]
;i 2 f1;:::;ng. (6)
As it can be seen from xm
0 and xm
i , the subsidy exerts a positive e⁄ect on
3The second order condition for the public ￿rm requires 135 + 56n + 6n
2 > 0 and for
each private ￿rm, 9 ￿ 21n + 75n
2 + 36n
3 + 4n
4 > 0. Indeed, both conditions are ful￿lled.
3the R&D output of a private ￿rm, whereas the reverse holds for the public
￿rm. This implies that, similarly to an output subsidy (see White 1996;
Poyago￿ Theotoky 2001), a subsidy to R&D has a cost redistribution e⁄ect.
Hence, we can state that R&D subsidies may serve (at least partially) the
same purpose as output subsidies.
Substituting (3) ￿ (6) into (2) and performing the maximization with
respect to s, we obtain the optimal subsidy4
sm =
(a ￿ c)(5n ￿ 3)
n(5 + n)(7 + 2n)
. (7)
The SPNE solutions of the entire game are the following
qm
i =
(a ￿ c)(9 + 2n)
(5 + n)(7 + 2n)
;qm
0 =
(a ￿ c)(14 + 3n)
(5 + n)(7 + 2n)
xm
i =
(a ￿ c)(6 + n)
(5 + n)(7 + 2n)
;xm
0 =
(a ￿ c)(7 + n)
(5 + n)(7 + 2n)
￿m
i =
(a ￿ c)2[￿18 + n(153 + 65n + 7n2)]
n(5 + n)2(7 + 2n)2
￿m
0 =
(a ￿ c)2[￿21 + n(179 + 75n + 8n2)]
n(5 + n)2(7 + 2n)2
CSm =
2(a ￿ c)2[7 + n(6 + n)]2
(5 + n)2(7 + 2n)2 ; (8)
SWm =
(a ￿ c)2[7 + n(7 + n)]
(5 + n)(7 + 2n)
: (9)
It is important to note that although the optimal R&D subsidy im-
proves the distribution of total costs, it does not restore cost e¢ ciency.
Thus, it attains a second best in the sense that complete equalization of
production costs would require an additional instrument￿ a subsidy to out-
put quantity￿ at the government￿ s disposal.
4 Private oligopoly
The industry now consists of (n+1) pro￿t-maximizing (private) ￿rms. The
SPNE outcomes of the game are5
4With requirement for second order condition 6n
3(5+n)(7+2n)(135+56n+6n
2) > 0.
5The associated second order conditions are all satis￿ed and available upon request.
4sp =
4(a ￿ c)(3n ￿ 2)
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(a ￿ c)2[￿40 + n(361 + 174n + 21n2)]
3n(3 + n)2(9 + 2n)2
CSm =
2(a ￿ c)2(1 + n)2(4 + n)2
(3 + n)2(9 + 2n)2
SWp =
(a ￿ c)2(1 + n)(5 + n)
(3 + n)(9 + 2n)
: (10)
5 Results and Discussion
Comparing the results obtained in the mixed oligopoly and the private
oligopoly cases, we can state the following results:6
Proposition 1 The optimal subsidy to R&D output in the mixed oligopoly
is always greater than the subsidy in the private oligopoly, sm(n) > s
p(n).
The intuition behind proposition 1 follows: In the case of a private
oligopoly, two sources of market failure exist: (i) the imperfect competition,
which will lead to underproduction (and hence, allocative ine¢ ciency), and
(ii) the R&D undervaluation e⁄ect (as de￿ned by Ulph, 19997), which will
lead to under-investment in R&D by private ￿rms. In the case of a mixed
oligopoly a further source of market failure exists, the di⁄erent nature (pub-
lic or private) of the ￿rms in the market. As a result, the production costs
are ine¢ ciently distributed. Hence, it is optimal for the decision-maker to
subsidize more heavily a mixed market.
Proposition 2 The optimal subsidy to R&D output, si(n), i = m, p, is
always positive and increasing in the number of private ￿rms n, as n goes
from 1 to 2, but decreasing in n if n > 2.
6All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
7Private ￿rms do not take into account the increases in Consumers Welfare as a con-
sequence of the investment on R&D (as Consumers Welfare does not belong to their
objective function). This will result in underinvestment in R&D.
5Proposition 2 shows that, in contrast to the monotonic nature of an out-
put subsidy identi￿ed in previous contributions, the optimal R&D subsidy is
initially increasing and after a threshold value of the number of ￿rms (n = 2)
decreasing. This is a result of the interaction of the market failures identi-
￿ed above. The e⁄ect of imperfect competition becomes less important as
the number of ￿rms increases whereas the undervaluation e⁄ect will have
an inverted U-shape with respect to the number of ￿rms, as identi￿ed by
Suzumura (1992). The combination of these two e⁄ects (plus the ine¢ ciency
in the distribution of the production costs in the mixed case) results in an
inverted U-shape of the optimal subsidy.
The next proposition compares total R&D output, output quantity and
pro￿ts between the mixed and the private oligopolies:
Proposition 3 (i) Total R&D output in the private oligopoly is higher than
in the mixed oligopoly if n > 4; (x
m
0 +nxm
i ) < (n + 1)x
p
i . (ii) Total output




i ) > (n + 1)q
p
i . (iii) Total pro￿t in the private
oligopoly always exceeds total pro￿t in the mixed one; (￿
m
0 +n￿m
i ) < (n + 1)￿
p
i .
With regard to proposition 3, it is relevant to note that the public ￿rm







@n j, leading therefore to higher levels of total
R&D output in the private oligopoly than in the mixed one for su¢ ciently
large n (n > 4). It turns out, however, that the public ￿rm￿ s behavior
will not impact total output quantity in the same way and output will be
always higher in the mixed oligopoly than in the private one. Regarding
equilibrium pro￿ts, the underproduction problem will be more serious in
the private oligopoly than in the mixed one as a result of the lower inten-
sity of competition, leading thus to higher oligopoly rents and allocative
ine¢ ciency.
The next proposition contains a welfare assessment of privatization poli-
cies and is largely a consequence of Proposition 3:
Proposition 4 When government policy takes the form of an optimal sub-
sidy to R&D output, then privatization enhances total welfare if n > 4,
SW m(n) < SW
p(n).
6The intuition for the above proposition follows: First, we can state that
typically privatization improves productive e¢ ciency. The reason is that in
the move from the mixed to the private oligopoly optimum, the ine¢ ciency
in the distribution of production costs vanishes. However, privatization
worsens allocative e¢ ciency as it promotes higher oligopoly rents. It turns
out that the gains in terms of productive e¢ ciency will outweigh the losses
in terms of allocative e¢ ciency only if n is su¢ ciently large.
6 Conclusion
This paper aims at ￿lling a gap in the literature on mixed oligopolies and
privatization by introducing R&D activity and R&D subsidies. Our results
indicate that the optimal subsidy to R&D output is non-monotone in the
number of private ￿rms both in the private and the mixed markets and
that the mixed industry should be more heavily subsidized than the private
one. Similarly to an output subsidy, a subsidy to R&D can address the
ine¢ cient distribution of costs. However, in contrast to the welfare results
of privatization when output subsidies are provided, privatization is welfare
enhancing if the number of ￿rms in the industry is su¢ ciently high. Further,
under the same condition, privatization yields increases in the total R&D
levels. In industries with a small number of ￿rms, privatization would result
in a loss of surplus and decreases in the R&D activity.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: It is immediate to show that sm(n) > 0 as a￿c > 0
and ￿3 + 5n > 0 8n 2 Z+. Next, sm(1) < sm(2) because a￿c
27 < a￿c
22 . To
show that sm is decreasing in n i⁄n > 2, ignore that n is an integer; it must
be shown that dsm
dn < 0 i⁄ n > 2. This derivative has the same sign as the
expression 105 + 102n ￿ 67n2 ￿ 20n3. The latter is negative i⁄ n > 2. (The
proof for sp(n) is similar and hence is omitted). QED
Proof of Proposition 2: It will be shown that sm(n)￿sp(n) > 0 8n 2 Z+.
To this end, ignore that n is an integer. Then it su¢ ces to show that
37 ￿ 14n + 19n2 + 6n3 > 0 8n, which in turn is always true. QED
Proof of Proposition 3: Let ￿ = (3+n)(9+2n) > 0 and ￿ = (5+n)(7+







￿￿ < 0 i⁄ 14￿n￿n2 < 0. The
inequality holds i⁄ n > 4.
(ii) (qm
0 + nqm




￿￿ > 0 8n.
(iii) (￿m
0 + n￿m




3n￿2￿2 < 0 i⁄ ￿ > 0, where
￿ = ￿3073 + 44548n + 151318n2 + 139764n3 + 59759n4 + 13400n5 +
1540n6 + 72n7. It is not di¢ cult, although tedious, to show that ￿ > 0 8n,
which completes the proof. QED
8Proof of Proposition 4: In proving that SWm(n) < SWp(n) i⁄ n > 4,
it su¢ ces to show that ￿14 + n + n2 > 0 i⁄ n > 4. The result follows
immediately. QED
9